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Cell Phone Searches After Riley: 
Establishing Probable Cause and 
Applying Search Warrant 
Exceptions 
 
Erica L. Danielsen* 
 
Introduction 
 
Advancements in cell phone technology, use, and ownership 
continue to rapidly increase.  Cell phones have a substantial 
impact on modern day society which likewise creates a 
substantial impact on the law.  In 2014, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of individuals’ personal 
privacy concerns in their cell phones.  In Riley v. California1 the 
Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision, holding that 
when law enforcement officers seize a cell phone incident to a 
lawful arrest, they must first obtain a warrant prior to searching 
the phone.2  This comment addresses the Riley decision, its 
specific application under Fourth Amendment3 analysis, and 
warrant requirement exceptions which could undermine the 
Riley holding. 
Part I of this note discusses the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable search and seizures and its 
probable cause requirement.4  The Fourth Amendment’s text 
remains the same since its enactment.  However, interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment continues to evolve in order to stay 
current with society.5  Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
 
  *   Pace University School of Law 2016 
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
2. Id. at 2495. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
4. Id. 
5. See generally Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, 
CONSTITUTION CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
1
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also varies based on state constitutional law since states can 
provide its citizens with greater protection than the United 
States Constitution.6  This is why the United States Supreme 
Court, federal district courts, and state courts have all 
undergone thorough Fourth Amendment analyses when 
applying the true meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the 
advanced issue of cell phone searches. 
At first, Riley’s groundbreaking holding seems like a bright-
line rule for law enforcement and courts to follow.  However, the 
decision left open areas for additional legal analysis.  For 
example, how does the Riley decision effect the issue of 
establishing probable cause?  Part II of this note addresses the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.  Specifically, 
this note discusses how the Riley decision lacks guidance to 
determine what is sufficient to establish probable cause to 
obtain a warrant to search a cell phone.  Under United States 
constitutional law, courts apply a totality of the circumstances 
approach to determine if probable cause exists.7  However, some 
states, like New York, reject the totality of the circumstances 
approach and apply a strict Aguilar-Spinelli8 analysis to 
determine probable cause.9 
Since the Riley decision did not specifically state what facts 
and circumstances are sufficient, this leads to disparate results 
throughout the states because warrants are issued on the basis 
of which probable cause analysis the jurisdiction adheres to.  
Riley’s bright-line rule becomes diminished because states 
applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test require more information and 
reliability than a state which merely applies the totality of the 
circumstances. 
In addition to probable cause, a warrant application must 
state the “things to be seized.”10  The Riley decision fails to 
address what should be stated in a warrant application to meet 
 
6. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (New York 
adds greater protection for unreasonable interception of telephone and 
telegraph communications.) 
7. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
8. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410 (1969). 
9. People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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the “things to be seized” requirement.  How specific does a police 
officer need to be when he drafts his warrant application in order 
to adequately describe what he intends to locate on the cell 
phone? 
The rule that law enforcement now need to obtain a warrant 
prior to searching a cell phone inevitably led to further legal 
analysis.  The Court in Riley stated that exigent circumstances 
may justify a warrantless search, however, the Court provided 
only limited examples of the types of situations this may entail.11  
Part III of this note addresses Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement exceptions and provides examples of judicial 
responses to those exceptions thus far.  Common warrant 
exceptions include searches incident to lawful arrests12 and 
exigent circumstances, such as preventing the imminent 
destruction of evidence, pursuing a fleeing suspect, and 
rendering emergency aid.13 
Finally, this note concludes with an overall summary and 
proposed solutions to the Fourth Amendment and cell phone 
searches in regard to the issues stated above. 
 
I. Discussion of the Fourth Amendment 
 
“The United States Constitution establishes America’s 
national government, fundamental laws, and guarantees certain 
basic rights to its citizens.”14  The Constitution ensures that 
United States citizens enjoy the rights, privileges, and 
protections which this country affords.  When the Framers 
drafted the Fourth Amendment, they were concerned about 
“general warrants” and “writs of assistance” which allowed 
unrestrained searches of people and their homes without any 
cause to believe the person committed an offense.15  These 
 
11. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (providing examples 
such as  “[A] suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to 
detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the 
child's location on his cell phone.”). 
12. Id. at 2484-85 (holding the search incident to arrest exception does not 
apply to cell phone searches). 
13. See generally Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
14. The U.S. Constitution, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/topics/constitution (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
15. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494; Friedman & Kerr, supra note 5. 
3
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general warrants basically allowed the government to enter an 
individual’s home and conduct a full-blown search.  The Framers 
designed the Fourth Amendment with the intent to protect 
citizens from these highly intrusive general warrants.16  
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.17 
 
As with the vast majority of law, courts interpret statutory 
text through case law.  For instance, the Fourth Amendment 
protects “the people” which “refers to a class of persons who are 
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed 
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of 
that community.”18  Additionally, cases interpreting 
“unreasonable” provide examples of governmental action 
deemed both reasonable and unreasonable based on the 
circumstances of each case.19 
General warrants are clearly recognized as a “search” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  However, when conducting a 
Fourth Amendment analysis today, courts must follow Justice 
Harlan’s determination of a “search” based on his concurrence in 
Katz v. United States.20  To conduct this analysis, a court must 
make a twofold determination.  First, a court must determine 
whether the person exhibits an actual, subjective, expectation of 
 
16. Id. 
17. US CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
18. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
19. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) (“What is a 
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula.  The 
Constitution does not define what are ‘unreasonable’ searches and, regrettably, 
in our discipline we have no ready litmuspaper test.  The recurring questions 
of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”). 
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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privacy and, second, whether that expectation of privacy is one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.21  The 
Framers likely did not consider advances in technology, such as 
the modern cell phone, and therefore, the actual, subjective, 
expectation of privacy at the time of the framing was 
significantly different than the current expectation of privacy an 
individual has in a cell phone.  This is why the United States 
judicial system is obligated to continue to interpret and adapt 
the Fourth Amendment to conform to the advancements in 
society. 
Privacy concerns also develop through case law.  Courts 
address privacy interests in everything from cigarette packs to 
cell phones.22  In United States v. Robinson, pursuant to a lawful 
arrest, a police officer searched a defendant and found a 
crumpled cigarette pack in his pocket.23  The officer opened the 
cigarette pack and found heroin inside.24  In Robinson, the 
United States Supreme Court held, that pursuant to a lawful 
arrest, an officer may search an individual and all containers on 
his person.25  Based on the Robinson search incident to arrest 
exception, the People in Riley argued that an officer can search 
a cell phone as a “container” similar to Robinson’s cigarette 
pack.26  However, the difference is that “modern cell 
phones…implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated 
by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse[:]”27 
 
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be 
kept on an arrestee’s person.  The term “cell 
phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of 
these devices are in fact minicomputers that also 
happen to have the capacity to be used as a 
telephone.  They could just as easily be called 
 
21. Id. 
22. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
23. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 218. 
26. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478. 
27. Id. at 2488-89. 
5
  
2016 CELL PHONE SEARCHES AFTER RILEY 975 
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, 
maps, or newspapers.28 
 
A cigarette pack does not contain the private intimacies of 
an individual’s life in the same way a cell phone does.  Therefore, 
by acknowledging the storage capacity of a cell phone, a person’s 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy is extremely great. 
However, individuals do not have an expectation of privacy 
in another person’s cell phone.  Certain courts hold that text 
messages do not compare to telephone conversations or letters, 
even though under both state and federal constitutions, the 
contents of letters and phone conversations carry a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest.29  Once an individual 
sends a text message from their phone to a recipient’s phone, 
courts are no longer concerned with any privacy interest a 
defendant had in any digital copies of the sent text messages.30 
The Fourth Amendment also includes the terms “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.”31  A cell phone falls within the 
“effects” category.  Individuals use cell phones to access and 
store more information than a person could ever physically carry 
on their person, in their home, or in their papers or effects.  For 
example, if the police access the contents of a cell phone, not only 
can they observe call logs, which show the people the individual 
communicates with, but they can also see the person’s pictures 
and videos, depicting family, friendship, and romantic 
relationships, text message chains, internet access including 
health and medical information, bank records, financial 
documents, email correspondence, consisting of personal and 
work related information, and applications that describe the 
person’s most intimate characteristics, details, and events of 
daily life.32  Most people cannot and do not physically carry 
 
28. Id. at 2489. 
29. State v. Carle, 337 P.3d 904, 907, 911 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). 
30. Id. at 908.  See also State v. Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2015). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
32. Chuck Jones, What Do People Use Their Cell Phones For Beside Phone 
Calls?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2012/11/29/what-do-people-use-their-
cell-phones-for-beside-phone-calls/. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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around every piece of mail they receive, every picture they take, 
or every book or article they read, “[a]nd if they did, they would 
have to drag behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a 
search warrant in Chadwick…”33  Although no one physically 
carries around every document concerning their life, people now 
access all this information within seconds in the palm of their 
hand. 
The immense storage capacity of a cell phone shows that an 
individual carrying the phone has an actual, subjective, 
expectation of privacy in its contents.34  The fact that nearly two-
thirds of Americans own a smart phone shows that society 
recognizes this expectation of privacy as reasonable.35  An officer 
who observes the contents of a person’s cell phone without a 
warrant conducts a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Therefore, Riley provides this “search” with 
Fourth Amendment protection.36 
 
II. Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment 
 
Two important cases discuss how to determine whether 
probable cause exists for a magistrate to issue a search warrant.  
These two cases provide different tests for a judiciary to use 
when determining probable cause.  The tests are commonly 
referred to as the Aguilar-Spinelli37 test and the Gates totality 
of the circumstances test.38  The United States Supreme Court 
 
33. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that a locked 
piece of luggage requires a search warrant). 
34. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
35. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 
1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.  
See Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
36. It is important to mention that this note discusses a physical search 
of the contents of an individual’s cell phone and does not discuss the separate 
issue and circuit split of whether obtaining cell site location information 
requires a warrant.  See generally Orin Kerr, Fourth Circuit Adopts Mosaic 
Theory, Holds that Obtaining “Extended” Cell-Cite Records Requires a 
Warrant, WASH POST (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/08/05/fourth-circuit-adopts-mosaic-theory-holds-that-
obtaining-extended-cell-site-records-requires-a-warrant/. 
37. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410 (1969). 
38. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
7
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initially set out a probable cause standard requiring that (1) an 
affidavit for a search warrant must set forth underlying 
circumstances necessary to enable a magistrate independently 
to judge on the validity of an informant’s conclusion and that (2) 
affiant-officers must support their claim that their informant 
was credible or his information reliable, so that the probative 
value of the report can be assessed.39  Under the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test: 
 
[T]he constitutional requirement of probable 
cause can be satisfied by hearsay 
information…First, the application [must] set 
forth any of the ‘underlying circumstances’ 
necessary to enable the magistrate independently 
to judge of the validity of the informant’s 
conclusion…Second, the affiant-officers [must] 
attempt to support their claim that their 
informant [is] “credible” or his information 
‘reliable.”40 
 
Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme Court 
significantly broadened the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted a 
totality of the circumstances approach.41  In contrast, under 
Gates, “a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis…permits a 
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various 
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s 
tip…”42 
Although the totality of the circumstances approach is more 
lenient, encompassing a wide range of possibilities to satisfy 
probable cause, not all states follow the Gates decision.  New 
York, for example, continues to apply a strict Aguilar-Spinelli 
test to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a 
search warrant.43  States that hold true to the Aguilar-Spinelli 
determination provide its citizens with greater protection under 
state constitutional law, statutory provisions, and case law. 
 
39. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410. 
40. Id. at 412-13. 
41. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. 
42. Id. at 233. 
43. People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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Under either probable cause analysis, the Riley decision still 
did not address the type of facts sufficient to establish probable 
cause.  Is it enough for an officer to observe an individual talking 
on a cell phone prior to the officer observing criminal activity?  
Can a reliable informant call the cell phone proving the phone is 
used for criminal activity?  What if an officer observes, in plain 
view, a text message on the cell phone screen mentioning 
criminal activity?  These are a few circumstances law 
enforcement will include in their search warrant applications to 
try and establish probable cause.  Depending on whether a state 
enforces Aguilar-Spinelli or Gates, the determination of 
probable cause and the neutral and detached magistrate’s 
decision to sign a warrant will vary. 
 
A. Judicial Response to the Probable Cause Issue 
 
Prior to the Riley decision, New York already addressed the 
issue of whether to require a warrant to search a cell phone.  The 
Riley decision came down in 2014, however, New York courts 
have issued search warrants for cell phone in years prior.  In a 
case from 2011, a police officer stopped a car based on reasonable 
suspicion that a drug transaction occurred.44  The officer seized 
the defendant’s cell phone, and while the case was pending, 
obtained a search warrant to retrieve information from the 
phone.45 
However, even if courts issued warrants prior to Riley, the 
question remains: what information do police include in search 
warrant applications to establish probable cause?  An analysis 
begins by providing an example of a circumstance which clearly 
does not establish probable cause under either Aguilar-Spinelli 
or Gates.  An officer fails to establish the requisite probable 
cause if the officer conducts an unlawful search of a cell phone, 
observes incriminating evidence, and then uses that 
incriminating evidence in his search warrant application.46   
In People v. Marinez the police arrested the defendant, 
seized his phone, looked through it without a warrant, and found 
 
44. People v. McNair, 926 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (App. Div. 2011). 
45. Id. 
46. See People v. Martinez, 993 N.Y.S.2d 304 (App. Div. 2014). 
9
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two photos depicting a pistol resembling a pistol recovered in a 
crime.47  Thereafter, the same officer filed a search warrant 
affidavit specifically seeking to search photographs, among 
other things on the phone, stating there was reasonable cause to 
believe that evidence concerning the defendant’s possession of a 
firearm existed on the phone.48  This is a clear Fourth 
Amendment violation emphasizing that an officer cannot use 
information obtained from an unlawful search to establish 
probable cause. 
In United States v. Gyamfi, a police officer established 
probable cause to search a cell phone, the court issued a valid 
warrant, and the officer conducted a lawful search.49  An 
identified victim reported to police that people robbed him at 
gunpoint.50  After the robbery, the defendants contacted the 
victim on the victim’s cell phone instructing the victim to do as 
he was told or else he would be killed.51  The defendants 
demanded the victim cash checks at various banks.52  The victim 
showed the police the text messages from the defendants and the 
police observed the defendants’ phone numbers repeatedly 
calling on the victim’s phone screen.53  Eventually, the police 
arrested the defendants and seized their cell phones.54  The court 
found the officers established probable cause and issued a 
warrant to search the defendants’ cell phones.55  The court 
stated: 
 
The affidavits underlying the warrants set forth 
in detail the facts leading up to defendant’s 
arrests.  The affidavits also described the manner 
in which cellular phones were believed to have 
been used during the commission of the alleged 
crimes.  In particular, the affidavits stated that 
 
47. Id. at 305. 
48. Id. at 306. 
49. United States v. Gyamfi, No. 14 Cr. 157(PAC), 2014 WL 4435428, at 
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014). 
50. Id. at *1. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Gyamfi, 2014 WL 4435428 *2. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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[the victim] received repeated telephone calls 
from the phone number and that defendant 
Ayayee later received repeated telephone calls 
from that same number.  The issuing judge could 
therefore conclude that a fair probability existed 
that the defendants used their phones during the 
commission of the crimes and that, as a result, 
their phones contained evidence of the crimes.  
Furthermore, the warrants clearly identified the 
crimes for which the search was being undertaken 
and set forth the categories of information to be 
searched.56 
 
However, in a separate case out of Kings County, New York, 
police officers obtained a warrant to search a cell phone with less 
correlation between the cell phone and the alleged crime.57  In 
People v. Watkins, an officer observed a vehicle driving without 
its headlights on.58  The officer stopped the vehicle, frisked the 
defendant, and retrieved a loaded firearm from the defendant’s 
waistband.59  The defendant informed the officer he was 
recording the interaction on his iPhone.60  The officer eventually 
turned off the recording and seized the phone incident to the 
defendant’s arrest.61  Subsequent to the arrest, the officer 
applied for a search warrant to obtain data from the cell phone 
relating to possession of the firearm.62  The officer appeared in 
person before a judge and submitted a sworn affidavit regarding 
his first-hand observations of the defendant using the cell phone 
during the arrest and included that the defendant told the officer 
he recorded the interaction.63 
The court in Watkins found a sufficient correlation between 
the cell phone and the crime of possessing a firearm.64  The facts 
 
56. Id. at *3. 
57. People v. Watkins, 994 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 2014). 
58. Id. at 817. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 818. 
63. Watkins, 994 N.Y.S.2d at 818. 
64. Id. 
11
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formed the basis of the officer’s belief that evidence of possession 
of a firearm could be recovered from the defendant’s iPhone and 
that probable cause existed to issue the warrant.65 
 
B. Analysis and Solution to the Probable Cause Issue 
 
In Gyamfi, there is a clear correlation between the 
defendants using the cell phone to call and text the victim and 
the crimes the defendants committed.  However, an officer 
obtaining a search warrant with limited correlation between the 
phone and crime is concerning to the privacy rights of all 
individuals.  In Watkins, the officer presented facts to a neutral 
and detached magistrate that the defendant used a phone at the 
time of arrest and that the defendant informed the officer he 
recorded the interaction.  However, Watkins likely recorded the 
interaction between him and the officer for his own safety.  
Watkins did not record himself committing a crime.  Therefore, 
the court should not have issued a warrant based simply on the 
fact the defendant recorded the interaction with the officer. 
The court decided Watkins under New York law which 
applies Aguilar-Spinelli to probable cause determinations.  
Accepting for a moment that the officer met the first prong of the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test, reliable and credible informant, the 
additional prong concerning the underlying circumstances of the 
officer’s knowledge is unsettling.  If the defendant recorded his 
interaction with the officer for his own protection and thereafter 
the officer used that same information against him, then how is 
an individual supposed to protect his own interests?  The officer 
did not have information that the defendant used the cell phone 
in furtherance of criminal activity. 
Society should be extremely hesitant to accept that just 
because a person uses his phone at the time of arrest that it 
could mean he will lose his expectation of privacy in his cell 
phone.  It is common for citizens to record interactions with 
police officers and it is within their right to do so.66  A citizen’s 
 
65. Id. 
66. Caitlin Nolan & Thomas Tracy, NYPD Cops Receive Memo Reminding 
Them They Can Be Filmed While On Duty, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014, 1:17 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-cops-told-memo-filmed-
article-1.1898379 (“Members of the public are legally allowed to record police 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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right to record an officer on their cell phone should not be 
subsequently used against them to obtain a search warrant. 
 
C. What Constitutes the Things to be Seized as Listed in a 
Search Warrant Affidavit 
 
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant specifically 
contain “the things to be seized.”67  The issue that arises is what 
exactly must an officer state in a warrant application to meet 
the “things to be seized” requirement.68  Will general statements 
such as pictures, call logs, or text messages satisfy the 
requirement or must these “things” be narrowly described down 
to certain images, specific applications, or a specific date range?  
Additionally, even if the warrant contains specific “things,” such 
as evidence of a gun, how can the officer search for this without 
scrolling through other information in the process?  It is highly 
likely that an officer will scroll through hundreds of 
photographs, many of which will have nothing to do with the 
warrant.  This broadens the search for evidence of criminality. 
 
D. Judicial Response to the Things to Be Seized 
 
In People v. Watkins, the judge found the officer’s warrant 
application established probable cause based on the belief that 
the cell phone contained evidence of possession of a firearm.69  
The court stated: 
 
In our modern society, as the abilities of 
applications contained in cellular phones evolve, a 
warrant must be drafted with sufficient breadth 
to search the data of a cellular telephone to 
determine which application or file is of 
evidentiary value.  Indeed, multiple applications 
could have been running at the same time, 
 
interactions…Intentional interference such as blocking or obstructing cameras 
or ordering the person to cease constitutes censorship and also violates the 
First Amendment.”). 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
68. Id. 
69. Watkins, 994 N.Y.S.2d 818. 
13
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including a telephone call or video call.  Thus, just 
as with a search warrant for a home, while the 
scope of the warrant may be properly limited, had 
the police uncovered other acts of criminality, 
such evidence would fall under the scope of the 
search warrant. 
…Rather, a search warrant that allows an 
inspection of the entire cellular telephone is 
appropriate to determine what, if any, 
applications and files pertain to the subject of the 
observed criminality.70 
 
The search warrant in Watkins authorized officers to 
download all data on the phone in order to locate the specific 
applications and files related to possession of the loaded 
firearm.71  The court held the warrant was not overbroad, since 
it was limited to audio, video, and information related to the 
firearm recovered.72  However, it is unsettling that this is not 
overbroad.  The court allowed officers to download all data from 
the phone in order to determine which applications and files to 
search.73 
In contrast, another court held a search warrant for a cell 
phone was overbroad, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
where the warrant failed to state with particularity the items to 
be seized.74  The warrant in United States v. Winn authorized 
the seizure of “any and all files that constituted evidence of 
disorderly conduct which…essentially invited police to conduct 
an illegal general search” of the cell phone.75  The “any and all 
files” language expanded the warrant to the type of general 
search the Fourth Amendment specifically protects against.76  In 
Winn the detective used the following template in his warrant 
application: 
 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. See United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904 (S.D. Il. 2015). 
75. Id. at 918. 
76. Id. at 922. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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[A]ny or all files contained on said cell phone and 
its SIM Card or SD Card to include but not limited 
to the calendar, phonebook, contacts, SMS 
messages, MMS messages, emails, pictures, 
videos, images, ringtones, audio files, all call logs, 
installed application data, GPS information, WIFI 
information, internet history and usage, any 
system files on phone, SIM Card, or SD Card, or 
any data contained in the cell phone, SIM Card or 
SD Card to include deleted space.77 
 
Since the Winn warrant application stated “any and all 
files”78 and the police used standard template language, the 
court held it failed to establish the “things to be seized”79 
requirement.80  Therefore, a warrant application cannot contain 
general boilerplate language but rather must be specifically 
tailored to the facts of each case.81 
Additionally, in United States v. Vega-Cervantes a search 
warrant authorized officers to look for: 
 
(a) lists of customers and related identifying 
information; 
(b) types, amounts, and prices of drugs trafficked 
as well as dates, places, and amounts of specific 
transactions; 
(c) any information related to sources of drugs 
(including names, addresses, phone numbers, or 
any other identifying information); 
(d) any information recording schedule or travel; 
(e) all bank records, checks, credit card bills, 
account information, and other financial records; 
and 
(f) any and all communications with co-
conspirators, including but not limited to voice 
 
77. Id. at 911. 
78. See id. at 918. 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
80. See Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 922. 
81. See generally id. 
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calls, text messages, and pin-to-pin messages.82 
 
The court in Vega-Cervantes held the items to be seized and 
the search conducted was valid since the defendant failed to 
support his argument that the Government “copied and saved 
all the contents from his BlackBerry.”83  The court stated that 
the items the defendant “identified as being seized appeare[d] to 
fall within the scope of the search authorized by the warrant” 
and, therefore, he “failed to satisfy his burden to show that the 
search of his BlackBerry amounted to a ‘flagrant disregard’ of 
the warrant’s terms.”84 
 
E. Analysis and Solution to the Things to be Seized 
 
Allowing law enforcement to download all data from a cell 
phone should exceed permissible governmental action.  In 
Watkins, the court issued a search warrant based on facts that 
the defendant recorded his interaction with the officer.  Since 
the officer based his warrant affidavit on this fact, the warrant, 
if issued at all, should be limited to audio and video data on the 
date and at the time of the interaction only.  The officer failed to 
state additional facts for a neutral and detached magistrate to 
reasonably believe that additional evidence of criminality was 
stored elsewhere on the phone.  The only potentially relevant 
evidence was the recorded interaction between the defendant 
and the officer.  If a court allows law enforcement to download 
all data in order to locate specific applications, which may or 
may not contain criminal activity, this only broadens the 
permissible scope of the warrant. 
In comparison, the Winn court correctly held that using 
standard boilerplate language in cell phone warrant 
applications is insufficient.  The officer in Winn attempted to 
gain access to all information on the cell phone rather than 
specific evidence related to the case.  Issuing a search warrant 
in Winn would have increased the officer’s chances of obtaining 
 
82. United States v. Vega-Cervantes, No. 1:14-CR-234-WSD, 2015 WL 
4877657, at *18-19 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2015). 
83. Id. at *19. 
84. Id. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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incriminating evidence unrelated to the case.  The judicial 
process to obtain a warrant cannot function as a way for law 
enforcement to gain unlimited access to the intimate private 
details of an individual’s life.  Without sufficient facts of what an 
officer is looking for and the location on the phone where that 
information may be stored, the “place to be searched” and 
“things to be seized” requirement is not met and the warrant 
should not be issued.  Allowing wide range to conduct a cell 
phone search brings the Fourth Amendment analysis back full 
circle to the general warrants the Fourth Amendment protects 
against. 
 
III. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
 
Although the Fourth Amendment specifically provides for a 
warrant requirement, over the years courts develop many 
exceptions to the general rule.  Exceptions include searches 
incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, consent, plain view, 
the automobile exception, inevitable discovery, and good faith.  
The Court in Riley stated the search incident to arrest exception 
does not apply to cell phone searches.85  However, Riley left open 
the possibility for other case specific exceptions to apply 
depending on the circumstances. 
Exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless search of 
a cell phone.86  When the exigencies of a situation make law 
enforcement needs so compelling that a warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
exigency exception may apply.87  Exigencies include rendering 
emergency aid to an individual, hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, 
preventing the imminent destruction of evidence, and the safety 
of law enforcement officers or other individuals.88  However, the 
police cannot create the exigent circumstance.89  The Riley 
decision provides specific examples of exigent circumstances 
which may apply to a cell phone search, such as “a suspect 
texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate 
 
85. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
86. Id. at 2494. 
87. See generally Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
88. Id. at 460. 
89. Id. at 461. 
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a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the 
child’s location on his cell phone.”90  However, the Riley decision 
only mentions these few extreme scenarios which may override 
the warrant requirement in certain fact specific cases.  One can 
imply that since Riley provided such extreme examples, only in 
rare cases will exigent circumstances justify a warrantless 
search of a cell phone. 
Other exceptions may also apply, including the voluntary 
consent of the owner of the cell phone.  If a police officer attempts 
to justify a search based on consent, the question becomes 
“whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, [and] is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances.”91  However, consent leads to the unfortunate 
circumstance when an individual does not realize he has a right 
to refuse consent.  If an individual does not know they have a 
right to refuse a request to search their cell phone, then any 
incriminating evidence found in the cell phone, due to the 
individual’s lack of knowledge, can be used against them. 
Subsequent to the Riley decision, courts also addressed 
plain view, the automobile exception, inevitable discovery, and 
good faith.  Some of these arguments have been successful while 
some have not.  However, this does not mean certain exceptions 
will never be successful.  A warrantless search of a cell phone 
may fall into various exceptions with the right facts. 
 
A. Judicial Responses to Warrant Requirement Exceptions 
 
1.  Exigent Circumstances 
 
In United States v. Camou, the court addressed and rejected 
various exceptions for a warrantless search of a cell phone.92  In 
Camou a border patrol agent stopped a truck at a checkpoint in 
California, arrested the defendant when he found an 
undocumented immigrant in the truck, and then seized and 
ultimately searched the defendant’s cell phone without a 
 
90. Id. 
91. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
92. United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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warrant.93  The agent claimed that he looked for evidence in the 
phone for known smuggling organizations but did not assert the 
search was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence or 
to ensure his or anyone else’s safety.94  During the search the 
agent reviewed call logs, videos, and photographs where he 
found images of child pornography.95 
The government argued that “the volatile nature of call logs 
and other cell phone information” that existed due to the passing 
of time presented an exigent circumstance.96  The court in 
Camou held that since the agent conducted the search one hour 
and twenty minutes after the arrest, an “imminent” “now or 
never situation” did not exist in order for the exigency exception 
to apply.97  Additionally, even if an exigency justified a search to 
prevent loosing data, the search was overbroad as it went beyond 
contacts and call logs and included a search of hundreds of 
photographs and videos.98 
Interestingly though, the Camou court did not address the 
border exception to the warrant requirement: 
 
[T]he basis for the border search exception is 
“[t]he Government’s interest in preventing the 
entry of unwanted persons and effects.”  Because 
of the strength of this interest, “[r]outine searches 
of the persons and effects of entrants are not 
subject to any requirement of reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”  However, 
this is not an exemption from the Fourth 
Amendment, but merely an acknowledgement 
that a wide range of suspicionless searches are 
“reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they 
occur at the border.”99 
 
 
93. Id. at 935-36. 
94. Id. at 936. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 940. 
97. Camou, 773 F.3d at 941. 
98. Id. 
99. United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 817-18 (D. Md. 2014) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Although Camou did not address the border exception, the 
court in Saboonchi denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the 
fruits of a warrantless search of his smartphone since Riley’s 
holding also did not address the border search exception.100 
 
2.  Consent 
 
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that when 
an individual is not in custody, the individual’s consent to search 
must be “voluntarily given, and not the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied.”101  In People v. Weissman, a New 
York court addressed the issue of consent to conduct a 
warrantless search of a cell phone by a court officer.102  In 
Weissman, a court officer believed spectators, while observing a 
jury trial, took a picture of him, in violation of court rules.103  The 
court officer instructed the spectators to come over to him and 
show him the pictures on their phones.104  He then asked them 
to scroll through to make sure there were no pictures of him and 
as they did the officer noticed a picture of a witness who testified 
the previous day.105  Since voluntariness is a question of fact 
determined from all the circumstances, the court in Weissman 
held that a reasonable person, free of any wrongdoing, would not 
have felt free to ignore the officer’s direction to come over and 
show the officer his phone and, therefore, did not give voluntary 
consent.106 
In contrast, in United States v. Garden, police officers 
showed a copy of a warrant to a defendant in order to search his 
residence, as well as all computers, computer files, and file 
storage devices, to locate evidence of child pornography.107  The 
officers subsequently asked the defendant, “[i]s it okay if our 
 
100. Id. at 815. 
101. Schleknoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
102. See generally People v. Weissman, 997 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 2014). 
103. Id. at 607. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 607-08. 
106. Id. at 613. 
107. United States v. Garden, No. 4:14CR3072, 2015 WL 6039174, at *9 
(D. Neb. June 29, 2015) report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 
4:14CR3072, 2015 WL 6039377 (D. Neb. Oct. 15, 2015). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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guys search your phone, too?”108  The court in that case found the 
defendant validly consented to the search, never recanted his 
consent, and therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, 
reasonable officers would have believed the defendant 
understood the officers intent to look at all data within the 
defendant’s cellphone for evidence of child pornography.109 
 
3.  Plain View 
 
Another exception, known as plain view, may arise when an 
officer lawfully searches an individual’s cell phone or lawfully 
seizes the cell phone and obtains a warrant but then observes 
incriminating evidence not specifically stated in the warrant.  In 
order for the plain view doctrine to apply, a police officer must 
lawfully be in the place where an incriminating item is seen, the 
item must be in plain view, and the item’s incriminating 
character must be immediately apparent.110 
In Sinclair v. State, a police officer physically opened a flip 
phone to turn it off and the court held this was not an unlawful 
cell phone search under Riley.111  When the officer flipped open 
the phone, he observed a screen saver photograph in plain 
view.112  The officer immediately recognized the screen saver 
image as a stolen item.113  The court held this was not an 
unlawful search and denied suppression of the image under a 
plain view theory.114 
Another court also found it reasonable, under a plain view 
theory, for the government to remove the back cover of a cell 
phone without a warrant.115  A cell phone’s serial number is “not 
the type of ‘sensitive personal information’ requiring a search 
warrant under Riley; instead it is part of the “‘physical aspects 
of a phone’ that officers are still permitted to inspect without 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990). 
111. Sinclair v. State, 118 A.3d 872, 888-89 (Md. 2015). 
112. Id. at 888-89. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. United States v. Lowe, No. 2:14-CR-00004-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 
5106053, at *3, *11, 12 (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2014). 
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fear of triggering greater privacy interests.”116  Similarly, 
removing the battery to view identifying information printed by 
the manufacturer or seller to obtain search warrants is a 
“minimally intrusive examination [and] does not implicate the 
privacy interests at issue in Riley…”117 
 
4.  Automobile Exception 
 
When an officer makes a “lawful custodial arrest of an 
occupant of an automobile, [the officer] may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”118  The officer may also 
examine the contents of any open or closed containers found 
within the passenger compartment of the vehicle.119  In Camou, 
the government sought to justify the warrantless cell phone 
search based on this automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement.120  However, Riley specifically addressed whether 
a cell phone is a “container” for purposes of the automobile 
exception: 
 
Treating a cell phone as a container whose 
contents may be searched incident to an arrest is 
a bit strained as an initial matter.  But the 
analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is 
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap 
of a screen.121 
 
Therefore, the Camou court, following Riley, held that cell 
phones are not containers and officers may not search the phone 
under the automobile exception.122 
 
116. Id. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (moving stereo 
equipment to locate serial numbers constituted a “search,” which had to be 
supported by probable cause, even though the officer was lawfully present 
where the equipment was located.) 
117. United States v. Vega-Cervantes, No. 1:14-CR-234-WSD, 2015 WL 
4877657, at *15 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2015). 
118. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
119. Id. at 461. 
120. See United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 941-43 (9th Cir. 2014). 
121. Id. at 942 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491). 
122. Id. at 943. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
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It is interesting to mention a distinction here to New York 
State law.  The United States Supreme Court, under New York 
v. Belton, allows police officers to search the entire passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, including any open or closed 
containers therein, incident to arresting a passenger of the 
vehicle.123  This holding is based on the “grabbable area” 
rationale established in Chimel.124  In Chimel, the police 
searched the “grabbable area” consisting of a room where they 
arrested the defendant.125  The grabbable area did not include a 
full blown search of the defendant’s entire house.126  The Chimel 
theory emphasizes that a defendant can reach within his or her 
“grabbable area” for a weapon or to destroy evidence.127  
However, after the United States Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the Belton case, the New York Court of Appeals 
declined to follow the Chimel grabbable area rationale for 
automobile searches under New York State law.128  New York 
State law allows police officers to conduct a Belton search of the 
passenger compartment and any containers therein, not based 
on a grabbable area theory, but rather based on the automobile 
exception alone.129  This requires the police to establish probable 
cause that evidence of criminality is located in the vehicle.130 
 
5.  Abandonment 
 
When a person abandons an item, he generally loses any 
expectation of privacy he otherwise had in the item.  In State v. 
Samalia, the police pulled over the defendant and when the 
officer approached the vehicle, the defendant fled, leaving his 
cell phone in the car.131  The court held that the suspect’s hasty 
flight under the circumstances was sufficient evidence of an 
 
123. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
124. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
125. Id. at 763. 
126. Id. at 760, 763. 
127. Id. at 762-63, 768. 
128. See generally People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982). 
129. Id. at 746. 
130. Id. at 748. 
131. State v. Samalia, 344 P.3d 722, 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) review 
granted, 355 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2015). 
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intent to abandon the vehicle.132  Since the defendant abandoned 
the vehicle, the court stated Riley did not apply because the cell 
phone was also abandoned rather than seized incident to 
arrest.133  The search of the cell phone fell in both the 
abandonment and exigency exception to pursue a fleeing suspect 
and therefore the court did not require the officer to obtain a 
warrant.134 
 
6.  Inevitable Discovery 
 
The exclusionary rule does not apply if a court determines 
law enforcement would have discovered the evidence by 
otherwise lawful means.135  In United States v. Lewis, police 
officers used information they obtained during a warrantless 
search of a cell phone in their warrant application to search a 
hotel room.136  The court held that the “comment in the warrant 
application that the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell 
phones uncovered text messages consistent with large-scale 
distribution of controlled substances was cumulative to other 
information in the affidavit.”137  There was more than enough 
evidence in the affidavit to establish probable cause even 
without the evidence from the cell phone and therefore the 
constitutional violation was harmless error.138 
However, this argument does not allow police officers to 
bypass the warrant requirement simply because they may have 
probable cause to obtain a warrant.  Law enforcement could 
always disregard the warrant requirement if courts admit 
evidence obtained without a warrant just because the officers 
can establish probable cause.139  Therefore, the argument that 
an officer searched a cell phone without a warrant simply 
because he had probable cause and could have obtained a 
 
132. Id. at 725. 
133. Id. at 726. 
134. Id. 
135. U.S. v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). 
136. United States v. Lewis, 615 F. App'x 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2015). 
137. Id. at 337-38. 
138. Id. at 338. 
139. Camou, 773 F.3d at 943 (citing United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 
320 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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warrant is invalid to establish inevitable discovery. 
 
7.  Good Faith 
 
As a final example of a warrant exception, the court in 
Camou rejected an argument of good faith.140  The government 
argued that at the time of the search, Riley had not been decided 
and therefore the officer relied in good faith on then existing law 
that he could search the cell phone incident to arrest.141  The 
good faith doctrine arises out of United States v. Leon, where the 
Court admitted evidence found by police officers while 
conducting a search based on reasonable reliance that the search 
warrant was valid.142  While the search warrant was ultimately 
determined to be invalid, the Court did not exclude any evidence 
obtained from the execution of the invalid search warrant.143 
In Davis v. United States, the Court determined that when 
an officer conducts a search based on objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding precedent at the time, the exclusionary rule 
does not apply.144  This argument rests on the belief that if an 
officer acts in good faith, disallowing the evidence does not 
prevent illegal conduct by law enforcement.145  Even though the 
officer in Camou relied on good faith that a search incident to 
arrest allowed for a search of the cell phone, the court still held 
that the search was invalid because it occurred one hour and 
twenty minutes after arrest, clearly not contemporaneous to 
arrest.146 
Additionally, where an investigator sought a warrant to 
search photographs on a phone for evidence of an alleged sexual 
assault and the investigator testified he believed he acted under 
the warrant when he powered up the phone and searched its 
 
140. Id. at 944-45. 
141. Id. 
142. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
143. Id. at 922. 
144. Davis v. United States, 565 U.S. 229, 240 (2011). 
145. Id. 
146. U.S. v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2014).  Cf. United States 
v. Williams, No. 2:14-CR-30, 2015 WL 5602617, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 
2015) (finding valid warrantless cell phone search which occurred a year and 
a half prior to the Riley decision). 
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photo library, the court followed the good faith exception.147  The 
court held that since the investigator acted reasonably there was 
no reason to exclude the photographs found on the phone.148 
Another distinction to mention regarding New York State 
law is that New York declines to follow Leon’s good faith 
exception.  If the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, 
even if obtained in good faith, then the exclusionary rule’s 
purpose is completely frustrated.149  New York declines, on state 
constitutional grounds, to apply the Leon good-faith exception.150  
Although New York would not have applied good faith to an 
incident to arrest argument, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit 
in Camou may have applied this exception if the search had been 
contemporaneous in time to the arrest. 
 
B. Analysis and Solution to Warrant Requirement Exceptions 
 
Courts are generally not lenient in applying exceptions to 
the warrant requirement for a search of a cell phone.  So far, the 
requirement to obtain a search warrant to search a cell phone is 
strictly enforced.  Although the Court in Riley came down with 
what seems, at first, to be a bright-line rule, the decision left 
open the possibility of applying warrant exceptions.  Sometimes 
it is more common to conduct a search pursuant to an exception 
then it is to conduct a search pursuant to a warrant based on 
probable cause.  However, courts should not analyze these 
exceptions lightly and should only find exceptions in justified 
circumstances. 
The exigent circumstances exception does not apply as 
easily to cell phone searches as it does in other cases.  The fact 
that data on a cell phone does not likely pose a risk of destruction 
of evidence or a threat to police officers or the public makes it 
very hard for an officer to justify an exigent circumstance.  An 
officer can seize the cell phone, turn it off to preserve any 
evidence, and obtain a warrant prior to searching through it.  
This is how police officers should handle the majority of 
 
147. Moore v. State, 160 So. 3d 728, 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). 
148. Id. 
149. People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1985). 
150. Id. 
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circumstances involving a cell phone.  A court should only issue 
a warrant if an officer can establish probable cause.  There 
should not be many circumstances which require an officer to 
search a phone at the time of arrest.  Unless a rare exigent 
circumstance exists, similar to the examples stated in Riley,151 
an exigent circumstance argument should fail. 
Consent is likely an officer’s easiest way to avoid the 
warrant requirement.  Courts analyze consent to search a cell 
phone the same way as determining consent to search a person, 
a car, or a home.  Unfortunately, issues often arise when 
unfortunate individuals are unaware of their right to refuse 
consent.  In fact, police officers do not even need probable cause 
to ask for consent.  An officer may ask an uninformed individual 
to see the contents of his cell phone and the unknowing 
individual may give voluntary consent.  Then any incriminating 
evidence the officer sees may be used against the individual.  
The uninformed individual then has to challenge both the 
voluntariness of their consent along with the unlawful search of 
their cell phone.  Making individuals aware of their rights is an 
important aspect of ensuring Fourth Amendment protection. 
The automobile exception should also be an invalid 
exception to the warrant requirement as it relates to cell phones.  
Either an automobile search, incident to arrest, or an automobile 
search, based on additional probable cause, does not allow an 
officer to intrude into the data on a cell phone since Riley and 
subsequent cases hold that a cell phone is not a “container” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. 
Certain courts may apply a good faith exception to the 
warrant requirement if the search is contemporaneous in time 
to the arrest.  Cell phone searches made prior to the Riley 
decision could include the argument that since Riley was not yet 
binding precedent, the officer reasonably relied on a search 
incident to arrest.  Currently however, this argument fails for 
any search conducted outside of the timeframe between the 
Belton and Riley decisions. 
 
 
151. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (providing examples 
such as “a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to 
detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the 
child's location on his cell phone.”). 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
In the United States, privacy expectations are always a 
major concern.  These privacy concerns are now intertwined 
with the fact that cell phones are an important aspect of the 
majority of individual’s daily lives.  Over the past several years 
cell phone use significantly increased and is expected to continue 
to increase.  This led the United States Supreme Court to rule 
on the privacy expectations and warrant requirements for these 
devices.  Cell phone technology advanced from once being merely 
capable of dialing phone numbers to make a single voice call to 
transforming cell phones into hand held mini computers.  Cell 
phones allow the owner to view all information on the internet, 
store all types of data such as documents, phone numbers, text 
messages and photographs, and provide numerous ways to 
communicate with one another.  An individual carries more 
intimate details of their personal lives in his or her cell phone 
then they could ever physically carry in their pocket or purse.  
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court effectively 
expanded the Fourth Amendment search and seizure law to 
include cell phone searches. 
The United States Supreme Court directly stated, “[o]ur 
answer to the question of what police must do before searching 
a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple-
get a warrant.”152  Police officers and the judicial system should 
adhere to this bright-line rule.  However, as with all of the law, 
it is the obligation of lawyers, on behalf of clients, the state, and 
the government, to seek out legal interpretations and exceptions 
to these judicially created bright-line rules.  Individuals, law 
enforcement, and judges need to remember only three words, 
“get a warrant.”153 
 
 
152. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
153. Id. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/6
